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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, ORIGINALISM, AND THE VICE 
PRESIDENCY 
Joel K. Goldstein* 
 
Constitutional formalists posit that the Article V amendment process represents the only legitimate 
method of achieving constitutional change.  This view is challenged by numerous widely-accepted 
judicial decisions that have introduced new meaning into constitutional language by departing 
from original intentions, expectations, or meaning.  A similar, though less discussed, process 
occurs as, independent of judicial work, constitutional institutions evolve to take forms 
inconsistent with what the Founders imagined or the language they wrote suggested. 
The history of the Vice Presidency offers an important example of how constitutional institutions 
do and should change, sometimes in ways quite different from what various theories of originalism 
would suggest.  Although the Founders placed the Vice President primarily in the legislative branch 
and provided that he/she would be “President of the Senate,” the office has evolved to become a 
central part of the executive branch whose occupant almost never discharges the formal legislative 
role the Constitution assigns.  Nor does the Vice President’s successor role account for his/her 
activities.  Instead, the office has been transformed to function as an active part of the executive 
branch essentially through a common-law-like process.  To the extent that Article V is associated 
with constitutional change regarding the vice-presidential duties, it has largely confirmed, rather 
than prescribed, the changes that had otherwise occurred.  The reimagining of the Vice Presidency 
has occurred with broad support. 
The experience of the Vice Presidency provides a counterexample to constitutional formalism 
generally and to originalism more specifically.  Constitutional change through institutional 
evolution should become more relevant in thinking about constitutional amendment and 
originalism, especially as the proponents of originalism justify it increasingly not as a means of 
promoting judicial restraint, but rather as the appropriate way to interpret the Constitution.  This 
change lends greater importance to studying examples of institutional behavior in considering the 
merits of originalism as a guiding theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Constitutional formalism holds, among its central principles, that 
constitutional change can only occur through the amendment pro-
cess of Article V of the Constitution.  Those who regard the Constitu-
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tion as a dynamic document reject this premise.1  They believe that, 
independent of Article V, at least some constitutional provisions can 
take on new meaning and support behavior different from that origi-
nally intended, understood, or meant.  And they think that this 
adaptability is a desirable, even a necessary, characteristic of our Con-
stitution. 
Most such discussions focus on the Supreme Court as an agent of 
constitutional change and either celebrate or criticize its role in revis-
ing constitutional meaning through judicial reinterpretation.  Pro-
ponents argue that the Supreme Court does and should interpret the 
Constitution’s concepts to accommodate changing times and that 
many widely accepted interpretive results are inconsistent with 
originalist methodologies.  Opponents view such activity as illegiti-
mate and inconsistent with constitutionalism and limited govern-
ment. 
But much behavior of constitutional institutions occurs through 
the actions of political figures and independent of judicial interpreta-
tion.  And these institutions sometimes conduct themselves in a man-
ner quite different from what the Framers intended or expected, or 
from the meaning that that generation’s public would reasonably 
have attached to constitutional language.  If constitutional institu-
tions must comport with original meaning when it exists, then those 
who deviate from it act unconstitutionally, violate their oaths, and are 
properly subject to criticism, even sanction.  Yet sometimes, that di-
vergent behavior is met with widespread acceptance, rather than rep-
rimand, not only by those who advocate for a “living Constitution,” 
but also by those who, in other contexts, celebrate originalism.  And 
sometimes, that repeated practice produces enduring change in the 
way in which our government’s constitutional institutions operate. 
That has certainly been true of the American Vice Presidency.  Its 
constitutional character has been transformed from what the Found-
ers intended or expected, and its modern operation certainly does 
 
 1  See, e.g., HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION:  A CONSIDERATION OF THE 
REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11 (1927) (“And wholly apart from 
amendments by which the actual words of the constitution have been altered or added 
to, a living constitution cannot remain static.  Our constitution has, as we shall see, devel-
oped by the growth of custom, by the practices of political parties, by the action or inac-
tion of Congress or the President, and especially by judicial interpretation.”); Karl N. 
Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (1934) (discussing 
constitutional amendment by governmental practice); David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Liv-
ing Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973, 975 (2011) (“What is clear is that even when the 
text does not change, answers to the question ‘what does the Constitution require’ do 
change.”). 
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not conform to original design or meaning.  A dramatic, and ever in-
creasing, discrepancy separates the institution’s present reality from 
the Constitution’s original prescription.  Whereas our first Vice Pres-
ident, John Adams, lamented that his office was “the most insignifi-
cant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagina-
tion conceived,”2 all now recognize that Joe Biden holds a very 
consequential position.  So did Biden’s predecessor, Dick Cheney, 
and several who preceded him.  The transformation from the insig-
nificance of Adams’s office to the clear significance of Biden’s came, 
in large part, from the Vice Presidency’s migration from the legisla-
tive to the executive branch, and more specifically, from the Senate 
to the White House.  The change in the Vice Presidency is substan-
tial, fundamental, and enduring, yet it occurred independent of Arti-
cle V’s amendment process.  And that change happened because 
Vice Presidents, and everyone else, have ignored originalist guidance 
and largely abandoned the one ongoing duty the Constitution’s orig-
inal meaning assigned—presiding over the Senate—to enable the of-
fice to evolve into a significant contributing part of the executive 
branch. 
These claims about the Vice Presidency belong to a discussion of 
constitutional change, even though they describe the experience of a 
single political institution, one essentially remote from the judiciary’s 
constitutional work.  The Vice Presidency is, after all, the nation’s se-
cond office.  Whether its behavior squares with constitutional design 
or with a particular theory should matter, at least in assessing the de-
scriptive power of that design or theory.  Although other national in-
stitutions have also gained power during the last sixty or seventy 
years, the Vice Presidency is unique since it has not only experienced 
a substantially enhanced role, but also seems now to be widely per-
ceived in a much more positive manner than was true for most of 
American history.  Its stature makes its story important, and its suc-
cess suggests that its path may be instructive regarding constitutional 
change.  Finally, the experience of the Vice Presidency provides a 
case study of a wider phenomenon of constitutional change outside 
of Article V. 
The recent evolution of originalism also draws the story of the 
Vice Presidency into this discussion.  Until recently, originalism was 
primarily a strategy to restrain judicial discretion, a rationale entirely 
 
 2 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Dec. 19, 1793), in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:  WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES 
AND ILLUSTRATIONS 459, 460 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856). 
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irrelevant to an essentially nonjusticiable office like the Vice Presi-
dency.3  Now, originalism’s advocates increasingly justify it as the key 
to legitimate constitutional interpretation, not primarily as a means 
to restrain judges.  This new rationale has implications for assessing 
originalism.  If originalism is justified because it is synonymous with 
constitutional meaning, not simply as a strategy to control judicial 
behavior, then its use and value can and should be examined across 
much of the Constitution, not simply with respect to those portions in 
which the courts frequently engage.  The new rationale invites in-
quiry into whether a range of constitutional institutions, including 
those like the Vice Presidency that function largely outside the reach 
of judicial review, operate in accordance with the Constitution’s orig-
inal meaning.  And, if a gap separates the office’s performance from 
its constitutional design, does the discrepancy suggest that the office 
needs a course correction, or does it impeach some claims of 
originalism, formalism, and Article V exclusivity? 
The Vice Presidency offers a case study which discredits the claims 
of constitutional formalists regarding constitutional change.  It sug-
gests that repeated and accepted behavior works enduring constitu-
tional change; that sometimes, such change causes constitutional in-
stitutions to perform functions quite different from, and even 
inconsistent with, what their creators intended, imagined, or pre-
scribed; that such change occurs independent of Article V’s formal 
amendment procedures; that this species of constitutional change 
may command widespread support notwithstanding its departure 
from originalism; and that it provides a necessary mechanism to allow 
American political institutions to adapt to provide workable govern-
ment. 
This Article will use the recent history of the Vice Presidency to 
demonstrate this phenomenon.  Part I sketches the standard formal 
account of constitutional change, its link to originalism,4 and some 
objections to that account.  This Part further suggests that the recent 
 
 3 But see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (deciding whether an ex-
ecutive branch commission chaired by the Vice President was required to disclose certain 
records). 
 4 I am using “originalism” to refer to theories that assign priority to original intent, original 
understanding, original expected application, or original public meaning in constitution-
al interpretation such that they, or one of them, can and should override other modes of 
constitutional argument.  I do not mean to challenge the use of these interpretive devices 
as part of a pluralistic approach to constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 14–28 (1969); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Co-
herence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987). 
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evolution of originalist thinking increases the relevance of institu-
tional behavior in evaluating these matters.  Part II describes the Vice 
Presidency as originally conceived and constitutional changes which 
have transformed the office in a way which deviates from originalism.  
Part III draws some general lessons regarding constitutional change 
and originalism from the experience of the Vice Presidency. 
I.  THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF NEW ORIGINALISM 
Originalism rests largely on four basic and interconnected ideas.  
First, originalists believe that the Constitution, properly interpreted, 
is binding law.5  Second, originalists believe that a constitutional text 
should be interpreted to give its words their original meaning,6 either 
based on the intent or expectations of the Framers or, increasingly at 
least in academic circles,7 based on the original public meaning that a 
reasonable person would have attributed to its language when pro-
duced.8  Third, originalists believe that the meaning of constitutional 
language is static and does not change over time.9  Finally, many 
 
 5 Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A 
DEBATE 1, 3 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) (stating that 
originalists believe that “courts and officials are bound” by the Constitution’s text and 
original meaning); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism:  A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 375, 378 (2013). 
 6 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 2 (2004) (criticizing the departure from the “original Constitution”). 
 7 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 92–93; Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 2–3. 
 8 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011). 
 9 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Constitution means the same thing today as it will in 300 
months.”); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448–49 (1934) (Suther-
land, J., dissenting) (“A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does 
not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations.  It does not mean one thing at one 
time and an entirely different thing at another time.”); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393, 426 (1856) (“No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opin-
ion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in 
this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more lib-
eral construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was 
framed and adopted.  Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal 
called on to interpret it.  If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode pre-
scribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unal-
tered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption.  It is not 
only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the 
Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and 
as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, 
but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands 
of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States.”); Clar-
ence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution 
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originalists identify the procedures of Article V of the Constitution as 
the exclusive method of changing constitutional meaning.10  As Jus-
tice Hugo Black wrote in his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut,  
The Constitution makers knew the need for change, and provided for it.  
Amendments suggested by the people’s elected representatives can be 
submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification.  That 
method of change was good for our Fathers, and, being somewhat old-
fashioned I must add it is good enough for me.11 
These premises and that method have not, however, always been 
good enough for the Supreme Court.  In M’Culloch v. Maryland, Chief 
Justice John Marshall asserted that under certain circumstances, con-
stitutional meaning could be shaped by the repeated practice of non-
judicial public officials, especially if those acts engendered reliance.12  
 
means . . . what the delegates of the Philadelphia and of the state ratifying conventions 
understood it to mean . . . . [The] Constitution . . . has a fixed meaning that does not 
change.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (“Nothing new can be put 
into the Constitution except through the amendatory process.  Nothing old can be taken 
out without the same process.”); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 10 (2011) (arguing 
that Article V presents the only means of constitutional amendment for original-
expectations originalists); BARNETT, supra note 6, at 108–09, 126 (insisting on a formal 
amendment process as an exclusive means to changing the Constitution); Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 418 (2013) (“[T]he 
proper way to change ‘this Constitution’ is provided in Article V.  Judges are not allowed 
to update the text of the Constitution by changing the meaning it had at the time of en-
actment.”); Thomas, Judging, supra note 9, at 7 (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning 
can only be changed via Article V procedure).  But see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 218 
(1999) (“Constitutional constructions allow change in the effective meaning of the con-
stitutional text, but they are not analogous to textual amendments. . . . Although the 
amendment model may explain some forms of constitutional change, it must at least be 
supplemented with a more politically oriented model that is less reliant on a notion of an 
autonomous fundamental law and of judicial enforcement.”). 
 11 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also 
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676–79 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (reject-
ing judicial amendment of the Constitution in lieu of Article V process); Scott, 60 U.S. at 
426 (“If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the in-
strument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be 
construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption.”). 
 12 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“It will not be denied, that a 
bold and daring usurpation might be resisted, after an acquiescence still longer and more 
complete than this.  But it is conceived that a doubtful question, one on which human 
reason may pause, and the human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the 
great principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are 
equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the prac-
tice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice.  
An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith 
of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly disregarded.”); 
see also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 78 (1955) (“[W]e must remember that the Supreme Court is not the only 
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Later in M’Culloch, he spoke of “a constitution intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs,”13 to some extent echoing Justice Joseph Story’s in-
sights offered three years earlier in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.14  Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., too, thought that our nation’s experi-
ence, not simply constitutional text or original expectations, was rele-
vant in discerning constitutional meaning.15  In his majority opinion 
in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes rejected the idea that “the great clauses of the Consti-
tution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with 
the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon 
them.”16  And, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court unanimously 
declared that in addressing the constitutionality of racially segregated 
public schools, “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the 
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was 
written.  We must consider public education in the light of its full de-
velopment and its present place in American life throughout the Na-
tion.”17 
This disposition, as reflected in these canonical pronouncements, 
though inconsistent with literal adherence to constitutional form, 
finds support from sources that inform much constitutional thinking.  
The Framers ignored the Articles of Confederation, which condi-
 
force that is operating upon the Constitution.  Custom, even in most vital matters, may 
serve to alter it.”); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 135 
(1916) (“Executive power is sometimes created by custom, and so strong is the influence 
of custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”). 
 13 M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 415. 
 14 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326–27 (1816) (“It could not be foreseen what new changes and 
modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the 
charter; and restrictions and specifications, which, at the present, might seem salutary, 
might, in the end, prove the overthrow of the system itself.  Hence its powers are ex-
pressed in general terms, leaving to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own 
means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its pow-
ers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require.”). 
 15 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[W]hen we are dealing with words that 
also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that 
they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen 
completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize or to 
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their succes-
sors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must 
be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was 
said a hundred years ago.”). 
 16 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–43 (1934). 
 17 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
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tioned constitutional change on unanimous consent of all colonies18 
in order to produce a more perfect union under a more enduring 
Constitution with more relaxed (though still pretty rigid) amend-
ment provisions.19  In his formulation that “we must never forget that 
it is a constitution we are expounding,”20 Chief Justice John Marshall 
recognized that a constitution, by nature, must be sufficiently elastic 
to allow change without recourse to the amendment process.21  Many 
widely accepted decisions are difficult to reconcile with some or all 
forms of originalism.22  Accordingly, some argue that a living or 
 
 18 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1 (“Every State shall abide by the 
determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this 
confederation are submitted to them.  And the articles of this confederation shall be in-
violably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any altera-
tion at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in 
a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every 
State.”); see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 285–86 (2005). 
 19 U.S. CONST. art. V (outlining the procedures for amending the United States Constitu-
tion); see AMAR, supra note 18, at 286. 
 20 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 21 See, e.g., id. at 415 (“This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages 
to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”); Martin 
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326–27 (1816) (“The constitution unavoidably 
deals in general language.  It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this 
great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its powers, or to de-
clare the means by which those powers should be carried into execution.  It was foreseen 
that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task.  The instrument 
was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure 
through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable pur-
poses of Providence.  It could not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of 
power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter; and re-
strictions and specifications, which, at the present, might seem salutary, might, in the 
end, prove the overthrow of the system itself.  Hence its powers are expressed in general 
terms, leaving to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate 
legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom, 
and the public interests, should require.”); see also Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis 
and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REV. 33, 38 (1932) (“[T]he Constitution had ample re-
sources within itself to meet the changing needs of successive generations.  The Constitu-
tion provided for the future partly by not forecasting it and partly by the generality of its 
language.  The ambiguities and lacunae of the document left ample scope for the unfold-
ing of life.  If only the Court, aided by the bar, has access to the facts and heeds them, the 
Constitution, as he had shown, is flexible enough to respond to the demands of modern 
society. . . . In essence, the Constitution is not a literary composition but a way of ordering 
society, adequate for imaginative statesmanship, if judges have imagination for statesman-
ship.”). 
 22 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 8–
13 (2010) (discussing the various tenets of originalism and the difficulties of reconciling 
it with modern society); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 
713, 774–76 (2011) (criticizing new originalists’ efforts to reconcile originalism with some 
iconic decisions); William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Sig-
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common law constitution descriptively23 and/or normatively24 better 
captures and guides constitutional practice than does originalism.25 
Originalism is, of course, something of a “moving target” since it 
has assumed different forms in recent decades.26  As most prominent-
ly articulated by Robert H. Bork27 in the 1970s and Attorney General 
Edwin Meese28 in the 1980s, the theory focused on discerning the 
original intent of the drafters.29  The myriad problems with that ap-
proach30 soon manifested themselves and provided incentive to 
 
nificance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 
1270–76 (2011) (arguing that originalism could not produce various iconic decisions).  
Some originalists have argued that originalism could produce some of these results.  See, 
e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 
1132 (1995) (arguing that Brown was consistent with originalism); see also Randy E. Bar-
nett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 257, 260 (2005) (agreeing with McConnell’s conclusions that Brown was con-
sistent with originalism); Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 46 (expressing agreement with 
McConnell’s conclusions that Brown was consistent with originalism). 
 23 FALLON, supra note 22, at 270 (“For better or for worse, American constitutional practice 
thus relies more on flexible, pragmatic practices of constitutional interpretation than on 
frequent formal amendment.”); see also Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living 
American Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM supra note 5, at 78, 84 (arguing for 
the inevitability of living constitutionalism in a system with “far-ranging judicial review”). 
 24 STRAUSS, supra note 22, at 1–2 (“[T]he world has changed in incalculable ways. . . . So it 
seems inevitable that the Constitution will change, too.  This is a good thing, because an 
unchanging constitution would fit out society very badly.”). 
 25 Strauss, supra note 1, at 974–76; see also H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not An 
Originalist,” 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 259, 276–78 (2010) (likening constitutional interpreta-
tion to common law adjudication). 
 26 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 246 (2009); see, 
e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 670–71 
(tracing the development and abandonment of various theories of originalism); Solum, 
supra note 5, at 1, 7–12 (sketching the evolution of originalism from original intent to 
original understanding to original public meaning).  But see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459–62 (2013) (argu-
ing that most originalists agree on certain principles). 
 27 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13 
(1971). 
 28 Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States:  Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 
S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (calling for “jurisprudence of original intention” (empha-
sis omitted)). 
 29 Id. at 466 n.60 (describing original intent as an effort “to discern the meaning of the text 
of the Constitution by understanding the intentions of those who framed, proposed, and 
ratified it”). 
 30 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 212–13 (1980) (explaining that members of groups may have differing intentions); 
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476 (1981) (explaining the 
difficulty in determining a collective intent, particularly when many delegates might not 
have ascertained their own intentions); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:  A Guide 
for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1087–89 (1989) (pointing out the difficulty of as-
certaining the intent of the collective body of Framers, especially given incomplete rec-
ords and the fact that they did not discuss many contemporary issues); James E. Fleming, 
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search for a more convincing theory.  Some originalists replaced the 
original intent of the drafters with the original understanding of the 
ratifiers as the new suggested source of constitutional meaning.  This 
new prescription at least focused on the Constitution-making act of 
the ratifiers, rather than the often secret work of the Philadelphia 
proposers, but it inherited most of the problems of its ancestor.31  Ul-
timately, “new originalism” emerged.  Although various theories take 
different shapes,32 new originalism has generally focused on discover-
ing and applying the original public meaning of constitutional lan-
guage by focusing on what it would have meant to a hypothetical rea-
sonable person at the time,33 not on discerning the intent of the 
Framers or ratifiers or their expectations regarding how language 
would be interpreted.34 
A change in originalism’s stated rationale accompanied the new 
methodology.  Although proponents of originalism had advanced 
multiple arguments in its support, original intent and understanding 
had been justified primarily for their claimed ability to restrain une-
lected judges from exercising discretion more appropriately lodged 
in elected officials.35  New originalists abandoned that instrumental 
 
Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1177–78 (2012) (criticizing originalism for misunderstanding the 
Constitution as a “code of detailed historical rules,” rather than as a “framework or 
scheme of abstract aspirational principles and ends”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 895–96 (1985) (pointing out that 
the Framers’ generation looked to documents, not the subjective intent of the Framers, 
to determine meaning); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138–41 (2011) (describing how ascertaining meaning and 
translating it into remote times are problems for originalism); Mark Tushnet, The U.S. 
Constitution and the Intent of the Framers, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 217, 218–19 (1987) (attacking 
original intent). 
 31 Bennett, supra note 23, at 78, 95–96 (examining the common problems of original inten-
tions and original understandings); Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 9 (“[T]he move from inten-
tions of the framers to understandings of the ratifiers was not successful.  Much depends 
on what is meant by the ambiguous phrase understandings of the ratifiers.”). 
 32 See Colby & Smith, supra note 26, at 244 (describing a “profound internal disagreement” 
among originalists); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, 
or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 5, 7 (2011) (“There 
are multiple strands of originalism, with additional versions proliferating as rapidly as law 
reviews can publish them.”); Fleming, supra note 26, at 670–71 (tracing the development 
and abandonment of various theories of originalism). 
 33 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) 
(“[N]ew originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual draft-
ers . . . than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”). 
 34 Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 9–10. 
 35 See, e.g., Meese, supra note 28, at 464 (arguing that original intent would “produce defen-
sible principles of government that would not be tainted by ideological predilection”); id. 
at 465 (arguing for originalism as means to restrain judicial power); see also Colby, supra 
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rationale targeted at judges36 and replaced it with claims regarding 
originalism’s superior legitimacy as a method of interpretation.  
Originalists contend that constitutional interpretation, by definition, 
involves a search for the original meaning of the document.37  Some 
associated that methodology with a written constitution.38  Randy 
Barnett, for instance, argued that the primary purpose behind writing 
a Constitution is to “restrict the lawmakers,” a goal which would be 
impeded by adopting interpretive methodologies “whose purpose is 
to improve upon the content of a written constitution.”39  Others, like 
Keith Whittington, connected originalism to popular sovereignty, 
since those who ratified the Constitution were democratically elect-
ed.40  Lawrence Solum argued that original public meaning promotes 
the rule of law by giving the Constitution a fixed meaning “thereby 
insulated from ideological and political struggle” and that it reflects 
popular sovereignty since the Constitution was created through a 
process which, with all its imperfections, “must count as one of the 
most profoundly democratic moments in human history,” and the 
original public meaning was what that process produced.41  In any 
event, new originalists justify their methodology as reflecting the au-
thentic and morally justifiable constitutional meaning, not primarily 
as a strategy to limit judicial discretion.  It is more concerned with 
 
note 22, at 714 (“Originalism was born of a desire to constrain judges.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Whittington, supra note 33, at 601–02 (describing this brand of originalism as “re-
active theory” focused on responding to perceived judicial activism with “primary com-
mitment” to judicial restraint). 
 36 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 4 (1999) (disclaiming reliance “on traditional 
originalist arguments in favor of judicial restraint”); Whittington, supra note 33, at 608–09 
(noting the new originalists’ move away from a focus on restraining judges).  Some 
thoughtful critics doubted the ability of originalism to serve as a vehicle for judicial re-
straint.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial 
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005) (arguing that precedent does a better 
job of restraining judges than originalism); Strauss, supra note 30, at 137 (pointing out 
problems with originalism as a means of judicial restraint). 
 37 Whittington, supra note 33, at 610. 
 38 See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 88, 103–07 (arguing that originalism provides the appropri-
ate method of deciphering the meaning and maintaining the integrity of a written consti-
tution). 
 39 Id. at 103–04; see also Barnett, supra note 10, at 417 (“[T]he Constitution was put in writ-
ing so it could provide the law that governs those who govern us. . . . [T]he Constitution that is 
the supreme law of the land is this one, the written one, not a constitution provided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”). 
 40 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at 111–12, 152–59 (discussing originalism as advancing 
and preserving “democratic values” of the popular sovereign); Keith E. Whittington, Is 
Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 39 (2011) (espousing that 
originalism promotes the preservation of democratic values and popular sovereignty). 
 41 Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 38, 43. 
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generating “positive constitutional doctrine”42 than in constraining 
judges.43  These changes, in originalist methodology and justification, 
have implications for the operation of originalism.  Prominent 
originalist theorists have conceded that some constitutional language 
does not lend itself to the discovery of one original meaning.44  
Whereas earlier forms of originalism had allowed theorists to inter-
pret vague constitutional language based on the Framers’ purported 
intent or the ratifiers’ expectations, the defects in those methodolo-
gies led to their abandonment.  Yet, that move deprived originalism 
of the claimed ability to resolve many constitutional questions.  As 
Lawrence Solum nicely put it, new originalists abandoned the old 
originalists’ premise that the Framers’ intent “provided a sort of uni-
versal solvent that dissolved every problem of constitutional interpre-
tation.”45  They rejected as implausible the old originalists’ belief that 
constitutional meaning was determinate and instead came to see 
much of the constitutional text as underdeterminate, i.e., capable of 
resolving some questions at the core of the text but not others at its 
periphery.46 
The change in methodology necessitated a distinction between 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction, a dis-
tinction which some, but not all,47 originalists adopt.  Although 
originalists have not embraced a uniform delineation between these 
two activities,48 in essence, constitutional interpretation searches for 
the Constitution’s meaning, whereas constitutional construction is a 
 
 42 Whittington, supra note 33, at 608. 
 43 Id. at 608–09; BALKIN, supra note 10, at 16–19 (arguing for original meaning as the ap-
propriate method of constitutional interpretation rather than  as a method for restricting 
judges). 
 44 BARNETT, supra note 6, at 118–21; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 8 (1999); Solum, supra 
note 5, at 20–22; Whittington, supra note 40, at 37–38. 
 45 Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 20. 
 46 See id. at 1, 21–22 (arguing that the Constitution’s linguistic meaning does not resolve 
many important constitutional questions). 
47  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:  A New Theory 
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) (criti-
cizing constitutional construction); Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 3 (describing the interpre-
tation-construction divide as “more controversial” than other tenets of originalism). 
48  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 118–22 (viewing interpretation as less appropriate and 
ultimately insufficient when constitutional language is vague rather than ambiguous, but 
criticizing Whittington’s legal versus political distinction); WHITTINGTON, supra note 44, 
at 7–8 (describing constitutional interpretation as legal and constitutional construction as 
political); Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 3, 22–26 (distinguishing between interpretation that 
identifies meaning and construction that gives legal effect to constitutional terms); id. at 
1, 69–71 (describing various approaches to constitutional construction, namely construc-
tion as politics, construction as principle, and construction by original methods). 
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creative enterprise in which governmental actors implement constitu-
tional provisions which are too vague to hold one specific meaning or 
where constitutional gaps or contradictions exist.49  Originalists view 
interpretation as originalism’s domain but concede that it does not 
always dictate results.50  Some matters are necessarily left to constitu-
tional construction.  Even when original public meaning does not 
yield answers, it still may define the options in which construction 
may occur.  “Originalism insists that constitutional construction 
should be constrained by the original meaning of the Constitution,”51 
Solum explains.  Nonetheless, diverse modes of constitutional argu-
ment are accepted as part of construction,52 although originalists dis-
agree among themselves regarding exactly how constitutional con-
struction should occur.53 
In any event, the move to original meaning forced originalists to 
narrow significantly that part of the Constitution for which they 
claimed their theories provided answers.  The recognition that origi-
nal intent or understanding could not give meaning to vague consti-
tutional language necessarily left many constitutional questions for 
resolution by recourse to other modes of constitutional argument, 
including some which originalists had previously discounted.  This 
retreat has the virtue of candor, but it implicitly acknowledges signifi-
 
49  See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 
645–46 (2013) (calling for interpretation through constitutional construction when the 
Constitution is silent or uses vague language, principles, or standards); Solum, supra note 
26, at 469–72; Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 122–25 (2010) (describing various uses of constitutional construction). 
50  See Colby, supra note 22 at 731–34 (explaining that originalists believe that originalism 
can dictate results when constitutional language is rule-like and clear, but construction is 
needed when it is “more abstract and standard-like”); Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 20–26, 69 
(associating interpretation with originalism but recognizing areas of constitutional 
underdeterminacy where construction is needed); Whittington, supra note 33, at 611–12 
(explaining the need for construction). 
51  Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 26.  Solum also claims that most originalists “agree that the 
practice of constitutional construction should be constrained by the results of constitu-
tional interpretation.”  Id.; see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 
LOY. L. REV. 611, 645–47 (1999) (arguing that constitutional construction must occur 
“within the bounds established by original meaning”); Whittington, supra  note 49, at 121  
(describing constitutional construction as “built within the boundaries . . . of the inter-
preted Constitution”); id. at 130–31 (stating that interpretation constrains construction). 
52  See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 68–70 
(2011) (describing the role of competing normative commitments in constitutional con-
struction). 
53  See Solum, supra note 5, at 1, 26. (describing how originalists disagree regarding the 
proper approach to constitutional construction). 
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cant limits of originalism and that other modes of constitutional 
analysis are essential in order to implement the Constitution.54 
Although the new methodology narrowed originalism’s scope, the 
new justification of originalism made it potentially applicable to addi-
tional parts of the Constitution.  As new originalism presented itself 
primarily as the legitimate method to ascertain constitutional mean-
ing, not principally as a restraint on judicial discretion, originalism 
became relevant to interpreting parts of the Constitution that do not 
regularly figure in litigation, in addition to those portions which 
judges routinely encounter.  The new justification of originalism as 
the key to interpreting constitutional language logically applies when 
constitutional text is considered in the political arena, just as when 
judges address it.  That potentially broader assignment makes 
originalism accountable over a wider terrain.  As such, originalism 
must be evaluated not only by whether it can generate judicial deci-
sions which most are not prepared to abandon, but also by whether it 
can account for widely accepted institutional practices of our gov-
ernmental system.  Constitutional theorists now must consider the 
behavior of non-judicial actors in considering the merits of compet-
ing interpretative methodologies, a ramification some new 
originalists have implicitly recognized,55 even though much of the lit-
erature of new originalism still focuses on judicial decision-making. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY 
The story of the Vice Presidency presents problems for originalism 
as a descriptive and normative theory.  That history shows an institu-
tion, without any formal change in its constitutionally prescribed on-
going duties,56 evolving to perform roles quite different from, and 
even inconsistent with, original intent, expectations, and meaning.  
 
54  See Fallon, supra note 32, at 13–14 (discussing circumstances where originalists allow oth-
er modes of constitutional argument); Strauss, supra note 30, at 142 (describing the con-
cession of interpretation versus construction divide as “something . . . like conceding de-
feat”); cf. Whittington, supra note 5, at 388–91 (recognizing the utility of other modalities 
to discover original meaning or as shortcuts). 
55  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 105 (referring to original meaning as restraint on judg-
es and legislators); id. at 110–11 (“Some may argue that the original scheme as formally 
ratified was not ‘good enough’ to create laws that bind in conscience or, even if it once 
was, it would be no longer in today’s world.”); Whittington, supra note 40, at 31 (stating 
that originalism provides a “framework of principles to guide judges and other constitu-
tional interpreters in interpreting the constitutional text”). 
56  Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment arguably added some duties regarding deter-
mining and acting upon presidential inability, but any such duties were not ongoing, and 
they may have been implicit in the original constitutional scheme. 
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In short, the original constitutional Vice Presidency was an insignifi-
cant institution, primarily associated with the legislative branch, the 
main, ongoing constitutional responsibility of which was to preside 
over the Senate.  By contrast, the modern Vice Presidency is a very 
consequential office, almost exclusively associated with the executive 
branch, where it now has ongoing, not merely contingent, signifi-
cance, and its occupant almost never presides over the Senate.  The 
disparity between the original constitutional design of the Vice Presi-
dency and its present reality could hardly be greater.  Nonetheless, 
few criticize the Vice Presidency for now performing so differently 
from the course originalism dictates.  On the contrary, its evolution 
represents one of the great recent successes of American constitu-
tional institutions, one which has received bipartisan support over a 
long period of time.  As such, the story of the Vice Presidency fur-
nishes a descriptive account of constitutional change independent of 
Article V, one which has won normative acceptance. 
A.  The Original Constitutional Vice Presidency 
The Constitution, as originally ratified, gave the Vice President 
two functions.  His ongoing role was to be President of the Senate.57  
His contingent assignment was to be first successor, should the Presi-
dent of the United States die, resign, be removed, or be unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office.58  Although it is often 
impossible to confidently fathom the intent of collective bodies, a 
task made even more intractable when they acted 225 years ago and 
left incomplete records, it seems likely that neither responsibility ex-
plained the creation of the institution, a decision most likely made to 
help the initial presidential election system function.  Originally, each 
elector had two presidential votes, at least one of which had to be cast 
 
57  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”); 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE 
AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 51 (1928) (explaining that the Vice President’s “only func-
tions are to preside in the Senate and succeed the President”); id. at 300 (the Vice Presi-
dent’s “only ordinary function” is chairing the Senate); RAMSON H. GILLET, THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT; ITS OFFICERS AND THEIR DUTIES 109 (1871) (stating that being President of 
the Senate is the Vice President’s “only duty, except when there is a vacancy in the office 
of president, when the duties of that office devolve upon him”). 
58  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of 
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, 
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for 
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice Pres-
ident, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act ac-
cordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
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for someone not from the elector’s home state.59  The system was de-
signed to overcome parochial voting in order to promote election of 
a national President.  The second office was created to encourage 
electors to cast both votes seriously.60 
It is not surprising that an office conceived essentially for instru-
mental purposes related to the presidential election system proved 
insubstantial once governing began.  Indeed, at Philadelphia, Roger 
Sherman, who had served on the committee which proposed the Vice 
Presidency, had justified the role as the Senate’s presiding officer 
partly based on the realization that otherwise, the Vice President 
 
59  Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 3. (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Bal-
lot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with 
themselves.  And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of 
Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate.  The Presi-
dent of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.  The Person having the 
greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the 
whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Ma-
jority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall im-
mediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, 
then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the Pres-
ident.  But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representa-
tion from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a Mem-
ber or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be 
necessary to a Choice.  In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having 
the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.  But if there 
should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by 
Ballot the Vice President.”). 
60  Not coincidentally, the Vice Presidency and the Electoral College made their debut to-
gether at the Constitutional Convention, late in its proceedings.  The Founders assumed 
that George Washington would be our first President, but after his service, they feared, 
parochialism would prevent agreement on a national leader as each state would support 
its own favorite son.  Their solution was to give each elector two votes but to require that 
one be cast for someone from a different state.  The second votes would overcome local-
ism to elect a national President.  Creating a second office would promote serious voting.  
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:  JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 56 (2005); AMAR, supra note 18, at 
167–68; Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 811, 817–18 (2005) 
(discussing the role of the Vice President).  The person with the most votes, provided a 
majority, would be president; the runner-up would be the Vice President.  Indeed, at the 
Constitutional Convention, Hugh Williamson explained that the “Vice president was not 
wanted.  He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which re-
quired two to be chosen at the same time.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 537 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).  See generally Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitu-
tional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 510–15 (1995) (discussing the reasons 
the Vice Presidency was created and associating it with the initial presidential election sys-
tem). 
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would be “without employment.”61  Our first Vice President, John Ad-
ams, said that as vice president, “I am nothing,” but “I am President 
also of the Senate.”62  Adams later became thoroughly frustrated with 
his Senate role,63 but his formulation at least suggested where his pro-
fessional time was to be spent.  Alexander Hamilton supported Ad-
ams as vice president in 1788 partly because if Adams did not achieve 
that position, then “he must be nominated to some important office 
for which he is less proper.”64  The office was so insignificant that 
James Madison worried that his ally, Thomas Jefferson, might decline 
to accept it if he was the runner-up in 1796.65  Although Jefferson 
judged the Vice Presidency as “the only office in the world about 
which I am unable to decide in my own mind whether I had rather 
have it or not have it,”66 he ultimately decided to “have it” when he 
 
61  2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, note 60, at 537; see also THE 
ANTIFEDERALISTS 193 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1985) (George Mason stating that the Vice 
President was made President of the Senate “for want of other employment”); id. at 305 
(George Clinton stating that the Vice President was made President of the Senate “for 
want of other employment”). 
62  9 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 6 (Kenneth R. 
Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
63  DAVID MCCULLOCH, JOHN ADAMS 408–12 (2001) (describing Adams’s frustrations as Vice 
President). 
64  Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (Nov. 23, 1788), in 5 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON:  JUNE 1788–NOVEMBER 1789, at 236 (Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1962); 
see also CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE LIFE OF JOHN ADAMS (1871) (minimizing the duties 
of the Vice Presidency and stating that “[n]o high situation in the government of the 
United States could now be so easily lopped off without missing it, as that of the Vice 
president”); id. at 155 (“Though in some respects irksome, the duties of the second office 
in the United States are not laborious.”); id. at 157 (quoting Adams, minimizing the pow-
ers of his office); id. at 158 (quoting Adams’s letter of December 19, 1793:  “But my coun-
try has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention 
of man contrived or his imagination conceived.  And as I can do neither good nor evil, I 
must be borne away by others, and meet the common fate.”); id. at 166 (Adams complain-
ing that he was “confined to [his]seat, as in a prison, to see nothing done, hear nothing 
said, and to say and do nothing.”); Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Jan. 27, 
1789), in 25 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 478, 480 (Paul H. Smith 
ed., 1998) (describing Adams as possessing talents “beyond the proper duties of a V.P. 
which indeed are not very important”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Aaron Burr 
(Dec. 15, 1800), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 468 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1896) (expressing regret to Burr that his election as Vice President would deprive Jeffer-
son of his services in his administration). 
65  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 19, 1796) in 16 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 432, 433 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) (referring to the “inadequateness 
of the importance of the place to the sacrifices you would be willing to make to a greater 
prospect of fulfilling the patriotic wishes of your friends; and from the irksomeness of be-
ing at the head of a body whose sentiments are at present so little in unison with your 
own”). 
66  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 1, 1797), in 7 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, 
supra note 64, at 98, 98–99. 
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finished second to Adams, perhaps because he could not imagine “a 
more tranquil & unoffending station” which would provide “philo-
sophical evenings in the winter & rural days in summer.”67 
The Constitution’s original meaning conceived of the Vice Presi-
dent, although perhaps not a member of Congress,68 as occupying es-
sentially a legislative position,69 since he would serve as President of 
the Senate,70 the only ongoing function the Constitution conferred.  
To assure “a definitive resolution” of the Senate, the Vice President 
would have “a casting vote.”  Absent the Vice President, some state’s 
Senator would have to preside over the Senate, thereby depriving that 
state of equal effective representation.71 
Of course, the original Constitution did not dissociate the Vice 
Presidency entirely from the executive branch.  Article II sets out the 
Vice President’s term,72 selection,73 qualifications (implicitly),74 presi-
dential succession role,75 and susceptibility to impeachment and re-
moval,76 features which connect the Vice President to the executive 
branch.  Some Founders viewed the Vice President as an executive 
figure,77 and some scholars have subsequently concluded that the 
 
67  Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Jan. 22, 1797), in 7 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, su-
pra note 64, at 113, 114. 
68  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. (defining “Members” of the House of Representatives); id., 
art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (defining “Members” of the Senate); see also Memorandum from Nicholas 
deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Vice President, 
Participation of the Vice President in the Affairs of the Executive Branch 222 (Mar. 9, 
1961) (concluding that it is “troublesome conceptually” to categorize the Vice President 
as a member of Congress, but that the Constitution attaches him to Congress). 
69  But see 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 536 (noting Elbridge 
Gerry’s opposition to making the Vice President the President of the Senate as a violation 
of the separation of powers); Albert, supra note 59, at 821 (describing the office of the 
Vice Presidency as “the executive office”). 
70  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”); see also id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 5 (implicitly referring to the Vice President as an “Officer” of the Senate). 
71  See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); cf. 2 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 736, at 
524–25 (1833) (suggesting that if the Vice President did not preside, the state from which 
the presiding officer came would have too much or too little influence depending on 
whether he could vote). 
72  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
73  Id. art. II, §  1, cls. 2–4. 
74  See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating presidential qualifications which implicitly applied to the 
Vice President as presidential runner-up); id. amend. XII (making this point explicit, 
necessarily so since it created separate elections for the two offices). 
75  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
76  Id. art. II, § 4. 
77  See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 536 (quoting Elbridge 
Gerry as complaining that “[w]e might as well put the President himself at the head of 
the Legislature”); id. at 537 (describing George Mason’s view that the Vice President’s 
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Constitution made the Vice President an executive-legislative hybrid78 
or even an executive officer.79 
The latter view, in describing the Vice President as an executive 
officer, seemed to elevate form over substance.  Although Article II 
did confer various vice presidential features, from a functional stand-
point, it vested executive powers and duties entirely in the President, 
and gave the Vice President no executive role whatsoever unless and 
until the President died, resigned, was removed, or became disa-
bled.80  The Vice President was “an anomalous officer with an execu-
 
presence in the Senate breached the separation of powers); see also 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 113 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (describing the Vice President as part 
of the “executive power” in criticizing the Constitution).  But see 2 RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 537 (summarizing comments of Governor Morris 
implicitly challenging Gerry’s characterization); id. at 537 (reporting Sherman’s observa-
tion that the Vice President would be “without employment” absent the Senate role). 
78  See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, VICE PRESIDENTIAL POWER:  ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHITE 
HOUSE 7–8 (1984) (describing the vice president as “the only constitutional officer with 
both legislative and executive roots,” “a Constitutional hybrid,” and the only federal offi-
cial “with one foot in the legislative branch and the other in the executive”); MICHAEL 
NELSON, A HEARTBEAT AWAY:  REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON 
THE VICE PRESIDENCY 27 (1988) (referring to the office’s “hybrid status”); CLINTON 
ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 136 (2d ed. 1960) (describing the Vice Presidency 
as “[s]uspended in a constitutional limbo between the executive and legislature”); Albert, 
supra note 60, at 820 (describing the Vice President “as an officer whose functions would 
place her in both the executive and legislative spheres of government”); Goldstein, supra 
note 60, at 515 (describing the Vice President as “something of a constitutional hybrid 
between the executive and legislative branches” since he was “the constitutional successor 
in case of presidential vacancy” with “an ongoing duty . . . to preside over the Senate”); 
Roy E. Brownell, II, Constitutional Chameleon:  The Vice President’s Place in Both Politi-
cal Branches (Part I) 5 (Oct. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (sug-
gesting that the Vice President is a “constitutional chameleon” whose constitutional iden-
tity varies depending on contextual factors and providing extensive documentation); see 
also Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Le-
gal Counsel, to the Vice President, Constitutionality of the Vice President’s Service as 
Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Apr. 18, 1961) (describing the 
evolving role of the Vice President over the past century). 
79  Albert, supra note 60, at 821 (describing the Vice President as a member of the “executive 
branch”). 
80  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also id. (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 673–74 (1789) (Joseph Gales & 
William Winston Seaton eds., 1834).  The Vice President was not expected to perform any 
executive functions, but his contingent significance did have a consequence.  Id.  The 
House of Representatives debated whether he should be paid per diem, like senators, or a 
fixed sum, like the President.  Id.  Different views were expressed.  Id.  Madison success-
fully argued in the House of Representatives that the Vice President was entitled to a sub-
stantial salary, not simply per diem as legislators received.  Id.  Although the Vice Presi-
dent might sometimes be “unemployed,” he needed to be ready in case he was called 
upon to exercise presidential duties.  Id. at 685.  That required that he be close to the seat 
of government, withdraw from other vocations, and “direct his attention to obtaining a 
perfect knowledge of his intended business.”  Id. 
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tive title but without executive responsibility under the Constitu-
tion,”81 David Currie wrote.  Moreover, from a practical standpoint, 
the electoral system gave no reason to believe that the President and 
Vice President, having been contestants against each other, would be 
politically or personally compatible.  Inasmuch as election of the Vice 
President, unlike that of the President, was not contingent on a ma-
jority vote, someone the President’s political enemies supported 
could conceivably win the second office.  Adams captured the nature 
of his executive role when he said, “I am Vice President, in this I am 
nothing, but I may be everything.”82  The vice presidential executive 
role was entirely contingent, whereas the Senate-presiding function 
was certain and ongoing. 
Elsewhere, the Constitution suggested a conflict between the Vice 
President’s legislative and executive roles.  The Constitution disquali-
fied the Vice President from presiding over the Senate when “he shall 
exercise the office of President of the United States.”83  That prohibi-
tion reflected the principle that no person could “preside over both 
the legislative and the executive simultaneously.”84  And the Incom-
patibility Clause precluded members of Congress from holding any 
office under the United States.85  Even though neither of those two 
provisions addressed whether the Vice President could handle execu-
tive functions while serving as the Senate President, one could infer 
that the principle animating them counseled that he should not.  Al-
ternatively, the Vice President’s connections to the executive branch 
might suggest that the Constitution did not prohibit him from play-
ing some executive branch role even while Vice President, especially 
since the Constitution did not expressly proscribe such activity.86  As is 
often the case, no constitutional clause, nor recoverable original 
meaning, makes clear whether the Vice President could take on ex-
ecutive roles (short of exercising the Presidency).  Absent a very for-
malistic view of separation of powers, under the original Constitution, 
 
81  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829–1861, 
at 181 (2005). 
82  9 DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY, supra note 62, at 6. 
83  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a Pres-
ident pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the 
Office of President of the United States.”). 
84  AMAR, supra note 18, at 171. 
85  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, 
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). 
86  Brownell, supra note 78, at (Part II) 14–15 (pointing out that the First Congress included 
the President of the Senate, as well as the Chief Justice, on a board overseeing the federal 
sinking fund, thereby discharging an executive function). 
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the Vice President’s connections to the executive branch would seem 
to allow him to undertake some executive branch functions, so long 
as they did not conflict with his legislative branch role.  Yet, the con-
trast between the actual and ongoing Senate role and the contingent 
executive assignment surely located the office, as an original matter, 
primarily in the legislative branch,87 unless and until a presidential va-
cancy caused him to migrate to Article II.88 
Early leaders embraced this vision of the Vice President primarily 
as a legislative figure.  George Washington did not include Adams in 
his Cabinet,89 and Adams viewed his office as legislative.  He wrote, 
“The Constitution has instituted two great offices . . . and the nation 
at large has created two officers:  one who is the first of the two . . . is 
placed at the Head of the Executive, the other at the Head of the 
Legislative.”90  Adams’s successor, Jefferson, reached the same conclu-
sion.91  The second office appealed to Jefferson, since it would allow 
 
87  Nearly twenty years ago, I wrote that the Founders had fashioned the Vice Presidency as 
“a constitutional anomaly located somewhere between the legislative and executive 
branches but not entirely welcome at either address.”  Goldstein, supra note 60, at 508.  I 
continue to regard that description as basically accurate, although I would now place the 
“somewhere” closer to the legislative branch because of the ongoing nature of the Senate 
duty.  See id. at 518 (describing the early Vice President “primarily as a legislative officer”). 
88  For a discussion of nineteenth-century views of the Vice Presidency, see Brownell, supra 
note 78, at (Part II) 5–27. 
89  See M’CULLOCH, supra note 63, at 415–16; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benja-
min Rush (Jan. 16, 1811), in 4 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES FROM THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 154–55 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829). 
90  Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Lincoln (May 26, 1789).  On another occasion, Ad-
ams wrote that the Vice Presidency “is totally detached from the executive authority and 
confined to the legislative.”  MARK O. HATFIELD ET AL., VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789–1993, at 7 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As Adams prepared 
to move from Vice President to President, James Madison referred to “giving a fair start to 
[Adams’s] Executive career.”  6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790–1802, at 304 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).  Some senators objected early in Adams’s term when Adams 
signed documents as “Vice President” on the grounds that it slighted his Senate role.  
MACLAY, supra note 62, at 43.  Adams agreed to sign papers as “Vice President of the 
United States and president of the Senate.”  Id. at 48.  Use of “Vice President” does not 
suggest a weakening of Adams’s recognition of the legislative character of his office.  Vice 
President was, after all, his title, one which placed the pompous Adams right behind 
Washington—therefore, it is not surprising that he liked to use it.  Cf. Brownell, supra 
note 78, at (Part II) 5–27 (collecting evidence of other early associations of the Vice Pres-
ident with the executive branch). 
91  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 7 WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at 119–20 (stating that he considered the office “con-
stitutionally confined to legislative functions, and that [he] could not take any part what-
ever in executive consultations, even were it proposed”); see also DUMAS MALONE, 
JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 300, 319 (1962) (stating that Jefferson did not 
consider himself part of Adams’s administration).  Malone reports that when Adams and 
Jefferson met in early March of 1797 before their inaugurations, Adams said that “the first 
wish of his heart” was for Jefferson to go to France on a diplomatic mission, but “he sup-
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him to remain at Monticello most of the year when the Senate was 
not in session,92 a conclusion which rested on the assumption that the 
Vice President lacked any executive role that would require his pres-
ence in the nation’s capital once the Senate recessed. 
“As to duty, the Constitution will know me only as the member of 
a legislative body,” Jefferson wrote to Madison,  
and it’s principle is, that of a separation of legislative executive and judi-
ciary functions, except in cases specified.  If this principle be not ex-
pressed in direct terms, yet it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and 
it ought to be so commented and acted on by every friend to free gov-
ernment.93 
Regardless of whether the Vice President was associated primarily 
with the legislature, the executive, or bridged the political branches, 
the Constitution’s original meaning envisioned the Vice President as 
the Senate’s regular presiding officer.94  “President,” according to 
Samuel Johnson’s contemporary dictionary, was “[o]ne placed with 
authority over others,”—in other words, someone who was “to pre-
side.”95  The Constitution prescribed that the Vice President “shall” be 
President of the Senate, a formulation understood to impose a man-
datory obligation.96  Senator Oliver Ellsworth, a constitutional author-
 
posed that was out of the question.”  Jefferson “promptly agreed that it was, on grounds 
both of impropriety and personal disinclination.”  Id. at 296. 
92  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 17, 1796), in 7 WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at 91 (stating that the Vice Presidency would allow him 
to remain in Virginia for two-thirds of the year, presumably since the Senate would be out 
of session).  Jefferson thought protocol required that the Senate notify a Vice president-
elect of his election, a belief further associating the second office with the upper house.  
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Tazewell (Jan. 16, 1797), in 7 WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at 106; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thom-
as M’Kean (Mar. 9, 1801), in 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at 12 (stat-
ing that as Vice President, he could spend eight months of the year at Monticello). 
93  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 22, 1797), in 29 PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 270, 271 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2001). 
94  See 2 ROBERT C. BYRD,  THE SENATE 1789–1989:  ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 167 (1991) (noting that as President of the Senate, “the vice pres-
ident was expected to preside at regular sessions of the Senate”); CURRIE, supra note 80, at 
181 (stating that the Vice President “is expected to perform the essentially ceremonial 
task of presiding over the Senate”); Timothy Walch, Introduction to AT THE PRESIDENT’S 
SIDE:  THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997) 
(describing presiding over the Senate as the Vice President’s sole constitutional duty); In-
terview by Donald K. Ritchie with Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian, 1964–1974, 
at 196–97 (Aug. 1, 1978) (on file with U.S. Senate Historical Office) (“[T]he Constitution 
assigns the Vice President with the responsibility of presiding over the Senate.”). 
95  1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) (defining 
“President” as “[o]ne placed with authority over others” and “To Preside” as “to have au-
thority over”). 
96  See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (stating that “shall” 
imposes a mandatory obligation); see also BARNETT, supra note 6, at 178–79 (arguing that 
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ity of the Founding generation, confirmed this meaning when he in-
structed Vice President John Adams:  “I find, Sir, it is evident & Clear 
Sir, that wherever . . . the Senate is to be, then Sir you must be at the 
head of them.”97  Adams reached the same conclusion.  His wife Abi-
gail complained that he never left the presiding officer’s chair.98  Jef-
ferson told the Senate during his vice presidential inauguration that 
he was “entering into an office whose primary business is merely to 
preside over the forms of this House.”99  Other than some days at the 
beginning and end of some sessions,100 he presided on a daily basis101 
and requested the Senate’s permission before leaving for home.102  
Senator John Quincy Adams observed that “the only duty of a Vice 
president, under our Constitution, is to preside in Senate”; he 
thought it anomalous that George Clinton, the fourth Vice President, 
had been chosen for that position without any regard to his ability to 
 
“shall” generally had mandatory meaning in legal context in the late eighteenth century); 
Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:  Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Juris-
diction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 231–32 (1985) (arguing that “shall” has mandatory meaning 
in the Constitution’s vesting clauses); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The Presi-
dent’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 571 (1994) (arguing that the Constitu-
tion “almost always uses ‘shall’ when it means to impose a mandatory duty”); cf. Barnhart 
v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 184–85 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
in a statutory context, “shall” presumptively has mandatory meaning). 
97  MACLAY, supra note 62, at 6; see also 2 BYRD, supra note 94, at 167 (“[As President of the 
Senate,] the vice president was expected to preside at regular sessions of the Sen-
ate . . . .”); Interview by Donald K. Ritchie with Floyd M. Riddick, supra note 94, at 196–97  
(stating that the Constitution assigns the Vice President the “responsibility” to preside 
over the Senate). 
98  Letter from Abigail Adams to Mary Smith Cranch (July 4, 1790), in 9 ADAMS FAMILY 
CORRESPONDENCE, at 73, 74 (Margaret A. Hogan et al, eds., 2009). 
99  6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1580–82 (1797); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF 
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (Washing-
ton City, Davis & Force 1820) 49–60 (enumerating several of the important roles of the 
President of the Senate); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Jan. 22, 1797), 
in 7 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at 110 (writing that he will be called 
upon “to preside”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 7 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at 120 (calling the Vice Presidency “hon-
orable & easy”). 
100 MALONE, supra note 91, at 360 (explaining that Jefferson missed the first month of the 
session beginning November 13, 1797 due to his daughter’s injury, his illness, and his in-
ability to travel due to inclement weather). 
101 NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., IN PURSUIT OF REASON:  THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 221 
(1987). 
102 JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS:  “PARLIAMENTARY POCKET-BOOK” AND A MANUAL 
OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 16 (Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., 1988) (reporting that Jeffer-
son “took his parliamentary duties with real seriousness”); MALONE, supra note 91, at 452 
(reporting that Jefferson took his presiding duties “seriously”). 
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fulfill that function.103  Elbridge Gerry, Clinton’s successor, presided 
throughout the Senate’s session, which began in May 1813.104 
To be sure, the Constitution empowered the Senate to choose a 
President pro tempore to preside when the Vice President was absent 
or acted as President of the United States,105 but that arrangement 
certainly was not a license for truancy.  Making provision for a substi-
tute does not imply that the principal’s attendance is discretionary.  
Just as the existence of the Vice Presidency does not authorize the 
President to neglect his duties, the possibility of a Senate-president 
pro tempore did not free the Vice President to ignore his constitu-
tional responsibility.  Indeed, frequent absence would compromise 
the reasons Hamilton said the Constitution provided for a presiding 
officer who was not a Senator.  Vice presidential absence would leave 
ties unresolved and require some Senator to preside, thereby denying 
his state equal representation.  The President Pro Tempore Clause 
was designed to allow the Senate to proceed when the Vice President 
was away, not to authorize absenteeism.  Indeed, that Clause confirms 
that the duty of the President of the Senate was to preside over the 
Senate, since otherwise, his absence would not require the selection 
of a president pro tempore. 
The ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804 changed the 
method of selecting, but not the duties of, the Vice President.  The 
unanticipated development of national political parties had exposed 
defects in the original presidential-election system,106 including the 
opportunity afforded a minority party to barter electoral votes to the 
rival vice presidential candidate in exchange for concessions.107  To 
deprive the Federalists of that leverage, the Jeffersonians pushed 
through the Twelfth Amendment, which separated electoral voting 
for President and Vice President.  Vice Presidents continued as the 
first presidential successors but did not consider themselves part of 
 
103 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 385 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874). 
104 Henry B. Learned, Gerry and the Presidential Succession in 1813, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 94, 94–95 
(1916). 
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a Pres-
ident pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the 
Office of President of the United States.”). 
106 The 1796 election installed a President and Vice President from rival parties; the 1800 
election revealed the more serious danger that someone who intended to be Vice Presi-
dent, such as Aaron Burr, might inadvertently wind up as President.  See generally  AMAR, 
supra note 18, at 338–41 (discussing problems with the original electoral system). 
107 See, e.g., Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 14, 1801), in HENRY 
ADAMS, THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATIN 286, 287 (1879) (identifying the risk that Federal-
ists might elect Burr as President in 1804). 
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the presidential administration and sometimes acted adversely to it.108  
Vice Presidents remained the Senate’s presidents and, throughout 
the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, regularly presid-
ed over it unless poor health intervened.109  That was their job. 
Consistent with the expectation that the Vice President would 
regularly preside, until 1890, the Senate chose a president pro tem-
pore only when the Vice President was absent or acting as President.  
The appointment terminated when the Vice President appeared,110 
generally within a few days, unless the Vice Presidency was vacant or 
its occupant was ill.111  Until 1886, the Senate’s president pro tempore 
followed the Vice President in the line of presidential succession.  
Vice Presidents generally absented themselves towards the end of the 
session so that the Senate could elect a president pro tempore to 
serve as the second successor during the recess, just in case.112  In 
1890, the Senate changed its procedures to elect a president pro 
tempore to hold office “at the pleasure of the Senate,” but to execute 
 
108 George Clinton opposed some aspects of Thomas Jefferson’s foreign policy and cast the 
deciding vote against rechartering the Bank of the United States, which the Madison 
Administration favored.  See JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON:  YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF 
THE NEW REPUBLIC 279, 289–90 (1993).  John C. Calhoun split with President Andrew 
Jackson over the Nullification Crisis, Jackson’s nomination of Martin Van Buren to be 
Minister to Great Britain, and other matters.  See JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE 
PRICE OF UNION:  A BIOGRAPHY 169–77, 185–86 (1988).  Chester A. Arthur acted to op-
pose some nominations President James A. Garfield submitted to the Senate; Thomas A. 
Hendricks battled with President Grover Cleveland; and Levi Morton’s laissez-faire man-
ner of presiding was thought to have contributed to the defeat of one of President Ben-
jamin Harrison’s legislative priorities.  See  HATFIELD, supra note 90, at 254, 264–65, 273. 
109 HATFIELD, supra note 90, at 247 (reporting that William Wheeler spent his Vice Presiden-
cy from 1877–1881 presiding over the Senate); RICHARD C. SACHS, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE:  HISTORY AND 
AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE 4 (2003); see Harold C. Relyea, The Executive Office of the Vice 
President:  Constitutional and Legal Considerations, 40 PRES. STUD. Q. 327, 328 (“Throughout 
the nineteenth century, the vice presidency was regarded as a legislative position, the 
primary duty being to preside over the deliberations of the Senate.”). 
110 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, 
at 11 n.36 (1997). 
111 See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE PRESIDENT PRO 
TEMPORE OF THE SENATE:  HISTORY AND AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE 3 (2012) (“During the 
period from April 1789 to March 1890, Presidents pro tempore usually served no more 
than a few consecutive days before the Vice President returned to displace them.”). 
112 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 256 (1938).  When the oppos-
ing party or administration enemies held a Senate majority, some Vice Presidents, like 
Elbridge Gerry (1813), George Dallas (1845), Chester A. Arthur (1881), and Thomas 
Hendricks (1885), refused to vacate the chair.  Id. at 257–58.  Gerry, for instance, calcu-
lated that the Senate might elect an anti-Madison-administration president pro tempore, 
whereas House Speaker Henry Clay, who would be next in line, was a reliable supporter.  
See HATFIELD, supra note 90 at 67. 
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the duties of the chair only during vice presidential absence.113  None-
theless, Vice Presidents continued to regard presiding over the Sen-
ate as their primary job.114 
In essence, then, under the original Constitution, the Vice Presi-
dent was an insignificant officer, essentially in the legislative branch, 
whose duty was to preside over the Senate when it was in session, ab-
sent extenuating circumstances.  Although various constitutional 
amendments have affected the Vice Presidency,115 the Constitution’s 
text, insofar as it specifies ongoing vice presidential duties, has not 
been altered in more than 223 years.116  Its original meaning makes it 
the Vice President’s duty to preside over the Senate. 
B.  The Vice Presidency Transformed 
Yet, the Vice Presidency, as a constitutional institution, has 
changed dramatically, mostly in the last sixty years, and especially the 
last thirty-five.  The office has gravitated to the executive branch, 
where it has become a highly consequential position the occupant of 
which helps guide and implement policy.117  Notwithstanding the 
 
113 21 Cong. Rec. 2153 (1890). 
114 See, e.g., 2 BYRD, supra note 94, at 167 (“From John Adams to Alben Barkley, presiding 
over the Senate was the chief function of vice presidents . . . .”); Marshall Opposed to Seat in 
Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1920, at 4 (stating that Thomas Marshall said that the Consti-
tution saw the Vice President simply as the Senate’s presiding officer). 
115 Many believe that the Twelfth Amendment diminished the Vice Presidency by construct-
ing an electoral system that separated the presidential and vice presidential elections, so 
that the Vice President was not the presidential runner-up.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 18, 
at 343; Albert, supra note 60, at 844–45.  The Twentieth Amendment made January 20 the 
beginning and ending date of presidential and vice presidential terms and provided for 
the succession of the Vice president-elect if the President-elect died and that the Vice 
president-elect would act as President if no President was chosen or if the President-elect 
failed to qualify.  U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 1, 3.  The Twenty-Second Amendment, 
which prevented a President who had been twice elected or served six years from running 
again, made it easier for a second-term Vice President to plan to seek the Presidency.  
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF A 
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 14 (1982).  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided a means to 
fill a vice presidential vacancy and set forth procedures for handling presidential inability.  
See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY 
AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1992). 
116 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment clarifies the Vice President’s role when various succession 
events occur, but that Amendment speaks explicitly to the Vice President’s contingent 
role as presidential successor, not to his professional activities in normal times. 
117 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115, at 134–35 (“Changes in American politics since the New Deal 
have drawn Vice Presidents into the presidential orbit.”); Albert,  supra note 60, at  812–
13  (emphasizing the significance of the evolution of the Vice Presidency from a relatively 
insignificant office to the second most powerful command post in the nation, after that of 
the Presidency); Goldstein, supra note 60, at 509 (“When the architects of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment met in the mid-1960s, they conceived of the vice presidency much dif-
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Constitution’s original meaning, the Vice President’s Senate role is 
now formal and infrequent, reserved for ceremonial occasions or 
when a tie vote seems possible.118  The Vice President spends more 
time most weeks in the Oval Office than he spends during a year in 
the Senate’s presiding chair.  No one now views the Vice President as 
unimportant, no one now sees him as essentially a legislative figure, 
and, notwithstanding the Constitution’s text and original meaning, 
no one complains that he never presides over the Senate. 
Institutional change is often evolutionary, and that was true of the 
Vice Presidency.  During the first three quarters of the twentieth cen-
tury the vice presidency migrated to the executive branch, and the 
modern office developed.  The office began to assume some small as-
sociation with the executive branch near the beginning of the twenti-
eth century and to attract more-credentialed people.  Vice President 
Calvin Coolidge met regularly with the Cabinet in Warren G. Har-
ding’s administration.119  The practice was interrupted when Coo-
lidge’s Vice President, Charles G. Dawes, declined a similar invitation 
in 1925120 but resumed four years later, when Charles Curtis became 
 
ferently than had the framers 180 years before.  They saw a robust office, firmly lodged in 
the executive branch, with a promising future.  They crafted the Twenty-fifth Amendment 
based upon that vision.”); Joel K. Goldstein, The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency, 
38 PRES. STUD. Q. 374, 376 (2008) (arguing that the Vice Presidency had moved closer to 
the executive branch by 1976). 
118 See HATFIELD, supra note 90, at xvi (“During the twentieth century, the role of the vice 
president has evolved into more of an executive branch position.  Now, the vice president 
is usually seen as an integral part of a president’s administration and presides over the 
Senate only on ceremonial occasions or when a tie-breaking vote may be needed.”). 
119 Coolidge Agrees to Sit in Cabinet at Harding’s Wish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1920, at 1 (reporting 
President-elect Harding’s request for Vice President-elect Coolidge to serve as an ex offi-
cio member of his Cabinet and Vice President-elect Coolidge’s agreement to do so).  Not 
all viewed the practice favorably.  See, e.g., Marshall Opposed, supra note 114, at 4 (detailing 
outgoing Vice President Thomas R. Marshall’s criticism of a Vice President regularly at-
tending meetings of the President’s Cabinet and warning that such an arrangement 
would contravene the intent of the drafters of the Constitution and impede the Vice Pres-
ident’s role as the Senate’s presiding officer); Vice President and Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 1920, at 8 (expressing misgivings regarding Harding’s proposal, noting that while the 
Vice President would surely provide useful advice to the President, the Vice President 
would have no other power or responsibility while sitting in the Cabinet and could find 
more suitable uses for his time). 
120 Coolidge to Drop Harding Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1924, at 18 (describing the re-
sponse to Dawes’s rejection of Coolidge’s invitation to sit on his Cabinet); Dawes Is Unwill-
ing to Sit in Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1925, at 2 (reporting Dawes’s refusal to attend Cab-
inet meetings because the practice “involves a wrong principle”); Dawes Won’t Sit in 
Cabinet, Refusing Coolidge Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1924, at 1 (reporting Dawes’s refusal 
to regularly attend Cabinet meetings). 
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Herbert Hoover’s Vice President,121 and has continued ever since.  
Franklin D. Roosevelt used his first Vice President, John Nance Gar-
ner, as an occasional legislative adviser and made his second Vice 
President, Henry A. Wallace, chair of the Board of Economic Warfare 
and of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board within the execu-
tive branch in 1941.122  FDR sent Wallace on goodwill trips to Latin 
America and China.123  In 1949, Congress made the Vice President a 
member of the recently created National Security Council.124 
These steps towards the executive end of Pennsylvania Avenue did 
not make the office overly taxing.  “A Vice President is bothered by 
nothing . . . . He has no work,” Dawes declared in 1927.125  Nor did 
these initiatives remove the Vice President from functioning as the 
Senate’s presiding officer, a task which remained the central and 
acknowledged preoccupation of the Vice President.  Dawes devoted 
his Vice Presidency to trying, unsuccessfully, to change the Senate’s 
rules in order to limit debate.  Curtis declared his pride in being 
called upon to preside over the Senate and judged it the desire of the 
Senate and the American people that he be “an integral part” of the 
Senate, not “remote” from it.126  To administer the Senate’s rules was, 
he said, “the whole scope and sphere of the Vice President.”127  Harry 
S. Truman was only Vice President for eighty-two days, but he devoted 
some part of virtually each day the Senate was in session to presiding 
over it.128  He rarely met with FDR during that period, and no one 
bothered to alert him to the Manhattan Project to build an atomic 
bomb until after FDR’s death.129  Alben W. Barkley, Truman’s Vice 
 
121 Curtis to Join in Cabinet Meetings; Will Participate in First One Today, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1929, 
at 1 (reporting Curtis’s decision to attend Hoover’s Cabinet meetings). 
122 Mildred Adams, Busy Mr. Garner Is Ready for Congress, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 30, 1934, at 5 
(reporting Garner’s early return to Washington at Roosevelt’s request to confer about the 
administration’s legislative program). 
123 HATFIELD, supra note 90, at 401–03. 
124 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (establishing the National Security Council). 
125 Vice President Has No Work to Bother Him, Dawes Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1927, at 1. 
126 71 Cong. Rec. 3 (1929) 
127 Id.; Dawes and Curtis Disagree on Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1929, at 4; see also Frank L. 
Kluckhohn, Competing for Quasi-Oblivion, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 20, 1936, at 8 (noting that 
presiding over the Senate is the vice president’s most important routine duty); Vice Presi-
dent Causes Stir, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1925, at 1, 4 (detailing Vice President Dawes’s speech 
at his swearing-in ceremony, in which he emphasized that the Constitution conferred on 
him the significant duty of presiding over the Senate). 
128 William R. Tansill, Memorandum, Number of Dates Certain Vice Presidents Actually Pre-
sided Over the Senate, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service (June 27, 1955, 
2). 
129 See DAVID MCCULLOCH, TRUMAN 333, 337, 376–79 (1992) (stating that Truman was told 
of the Manhattan Project only after taking office as President); HARRY S. TRUMAN, 
MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN: 1945:  YEAR OF DECISIONS 19–20 (1955). 
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President, recognized that the Constitution imposed on him the “du-
ty” to be the Senate’s presiding officer but offered to assume “any 
such service as any branch of the Government, or both branches of 
the Congress, may feel I can render” in addition to that “mere tech-
nical” presiding duty.130  Barkley was the last Vice President to devote 
much of his professional time to presiding over the Senate.131 
Major changes in American society and government during the 
1930s and 1940s fundamentally altered our political system, and ulti-
mately, these changes affected the Vice Presidency.  The New Deal, 
World War II, and the Cold War changed American government in 
ways that drew the Vice Presidency closer to the executive branch.  
The growth of the national government and America’s expanded in-
ternational role drew power to the executive branch and weakened 
local political machines.  The President’s domestic and international 
role increased, and technological change created new possibilities 
for, and expectations regarding, presidential activity and travel.  Be-
ginning in 1940, the President’s enhanced governmental role allowed 
presidential candidates to assume the leading role in selecting their 
running mates, a change which encouraged more compatible and in-
terdependent pairings.  These changes gave Presidents reason to in-
volve Vice Presidents in their administrations and gave Vice Presi-
dents reason to see the executive branch as salvation from the 
insignificant duty the Constitution prescribed.132 
The tenure of Richard M. Nixon as Vice President (1953–1961) 
marked a turning point in moving the vice presidency to the execu-
tive branch.  Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nixon built on precedents of 
earlier administrations and exploited technological advances to ex-
pand Nixon’s executive roles.  In addition to Cabinet and National 
Security Council meetings, Eisenhower enlisted Nixon to undertake 
diplomatic missions, to serve as a party surrogate and administration 
spokesperson, to help with legislative work, and to chair some execu-
 
130 95 Cong. Rec. 480 (1949). 
131 Interview by Donald K. Ritchie with Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian, 1964–
1974, at 66 (July 12, 1978) (“Vice President Barkley stayed in the chair anywhere from, I’d 
say, fifty to seventy-five percent of the time.”); Interview by Donald K. Ritchie with Floyd 
M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian, 1964–1974, at 45 (June 26, 1978) (“Vice President 
[Alben] Barkley was the last Vice President who stayed in the chair anywhere from fifty to 
ninety percent of the time.” (alteration in original)); Estimated Presiding Time of the 
Vice Presidents From 1949–1958 (estimating that Barkley presided about 33% to 40% of 
the time). 
132 See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115, at 301–08 (providing an overview of the Vice Pres-
idency in a historical context and detailing the reasons why and ways in which Presidents 
granted more responsibilities to their Vice Presidents). 
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tive committees.133  This work offered an ambitious Vice President like 
Nixon greater opportunity to use his office as a presidential spring-
board.  Eisenhower insisted that Nixon discharged these duties “vol-
untarily” because the Vice President, “with the constitutional duty of 
presiding over the Senate, is not legally a part of the Executive 
branch and is not subject to direction by the President.”134 
Form was, however, yielding to substance, and as other admin-
istrations followed suit, Vice Presidents were pulled from Capitol Hill 
to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, physically and constitution-
ally.  Early in 1961, Lyndon B. Johnson became the first Vice Presi-
dent with an office in what is now the Eisenhower Executive Office 
Building near the White House,135 so he could meet his executive “re-
sponsibilities most effectively.”136  Johnson also assumed roles like 
those Nixon had performed, building on precedents which “tended 
to increase the identification of the Vice President with the executive 
branch and the general acceptability of a delegation of executive 
powers to him.”137  When it was proposed, at Johnson’s urging, that he 
preside over the Senate Democratic Caucus, many of his former col-
leagues protested.138  “I think it was absolutely unconscionable and ri-
diculous,” recalled Senator William Proxmire.  “It was also unconsti-
tutional, in my view.  I mean, here you had the Vice President, 
representing the executive branch, coming down to run our cau-
cus . . . .”139  Proxmire and his colleagues had other reasons for their 
 
133 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115 at 152, 159, 178, 184–85, 190–91. 
134 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1956–1961, at 6 (1965). 
135 Johnson to Get Offices in Sight of White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1961, at 18 (reporting that 
President John F. Kennedy had arranged for Johnson to have offices closer to the White 
House than his predecessors). 
136 The President’s News Conference, 62 PUB. PAPERS 135 (Mar. 1, 1961). 
137 Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., Delegation of Presidential Powers to the Vice President, 2 
(June 22, 1961), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/062261.pdf (refer-
ring to delegations prior to 1961). 
138 See Minutes of the Democratic Conference (Jan. 3, 1961), in MINUTES OF THE SENATE 
DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, 1903–1964, at 577–79 (1998) (describing Vice President John-
son’s former colleagues’ protests of Vice President Johnson’s proposal). 
139 Transcript of William Proxmire Oral History Interview I, at 31 (Feb. 4, 1986) (on file with 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library); see also ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON:  THE PASSAGE OF POWER 168 (2012) (quoting arguments against Johnson pre-
siding over the caucus based on the constitutional concept of the separation of powers); 
Transcript of Hubert H. Humphrey Oral History Interview I, at 21 (Aug. 17, 1971) (on 
file with Lyndon Baines Johnson Library) (explaining Senator Humphrey’s misgivings 
about a Vice President being the chairman of the caucus on the basis of animosity among 
politicians in Washington and problems with separation of powers). 
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opposition,140 and it is hard to see how presiding over a party caucus 
could violate the Constitution, but Proxmire’s association of the Vice 
President with the executive branch suggested a new attitude regard-
ing the office.  It was moving. 
In 1965, Congress proposed, and two years later, the states rati-
fied, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.  It addressed 
vexing problems of presidential succession and inability, primarily by 
providing a means to fill a vice presidential vacancy and procedures 
to handle presidential inability.141  It implicitly endorsed the move-
ment of the office to the President’s end of Pennsylvania Avenue.  
The Amendment rested on a vision of the Vice President as an inte-
gral part of the executive branch, a premise its second section con-
firmed by allowing the president to nominate someone to fill a vice 
presidential vacancy.142  Whereas the original Vice Presidency had 
been deemed expendable, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment rested on 
the premise that the nation always needed a Vice President.143  The 
Amendment presumed that a President was entitled to choose a Vice 
President with whom he was politically and personally compatible but 
that Congress should be able to confirm (or not) the President’s 
choice in order to provide some democratic legitimacy.144 
Johnson’s four immediate successors, Hubert H. Humphrey, Spiro 
T. Agnew, Gerald R. Ford, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, increasingly 
operated from the Executive Office Building, a venue which repre-
sented their association with the executive branch.  They discharged 
a mix of executive assignments like those Nixon and Johnson han-
dled—committee chairman, foreign emissary, administration 
spokesman, partisan warrior, and legislative liaison.  They almost 
never presided over the Senate.  In February 1969, William 
Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel, advised that Nixon could make Agnew responsible for the 
 
140 See CARO, supra note 139, at 166–69 (discussing some Democratic Senators’ resentment 
toward Johnson’s exercise of power). 
141 See FEERICK, supra note 115, at 105–08 (explaining the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s proce-
dural guidelines for handling a situation in which the President is deemed disabled or 
unfit to continue in his position). 
142 See Goldstein, supra note 60, at 530–34 (presenting evidence that proponents of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment viewed the Vice President as part of President’s administra-
tion). 
143 Id. at 526–30 (stating that the drafters of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought that the 
Vice President’s position should be prominent). 
144 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115, at 234 (“It gave the President a leading role in choosing a 
new Vice President to help ensure compatibility between the two officers; it required 
congressional participation to introduce an element of democratic control.”); Goldstein, 
supra note 60, at 543. 
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Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.  Although the 
Vice President “occupies a unique position under the Constitution” 
and “his status in the Executive Branch is not altogether clear,” Con-
gress and different Presidents had given the Vice President various 
executive roles such that “his status may be characterized as Legisla-
tive or Executive depending on the context,” and his “availability” to 
serve as an executive branch member and chair of the body seemed 
clear.145  Beginning with Agnew, Congress added a line in the execu-
tive branch budget to support vice presidential activities.146  Although 
Vice Presidents had migrated to the executive branch, much of their 
time was spent doing make-work in an office, often more frustrating 
than influential.147 
The Vice Presidency of Walter F. Mondale accelerated and greatly 
expanded the executivization148 of the Vice Presidency.149  Mondale 
envisioned his job as trying to help the President succeed, not prepar-
ing to succeed the President.150  He conceived the Vice President as a 
close, across-the-board presidential adviser and troubleshooter.  Pres-
ident Jimmy Carter gave Mondale a West Wing office only steps from 
the Oval Office.  Mondale received copies of memoranda to Carter 
and could attend any meeting on the President’s schedule.151 
 
145 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the President, Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, at 2 (Feb. 7, 1969) (on file with author). 
146 See  LIGHT, supra note 78, at 69–72  (describing the development and impact of a vice 
presidential line in the executive branch’s budget); see also Relyea, supra note 109, at 330–
32 (describing financial and support assistance given to Vice Presidents). 
147 See Goldstein, supra note 60, at 543 (explaining that until the passage of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and the subsequent granting of new powers to the Vice Presidency, Vice 
Presidents had little influence and obscure, inconsequential duties); Goldstein, supra 
note 117, at 376 (describing the arrangement whereby Carter gave Mondale critical re-
sources including the right to attend important meetings and access to documents sent to 
Carter); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., On the Presidential Succession, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 475, 478 
(1974) (“History had shown the American Vice Presidency to be a job of spectacular and, 
I believe, incurable frustration.”). 
148 Walter F. Mondale, Former U.S. Vice President, Sideman:  Reflections on the Vice Presi-
dency, Address at Macalester College, at 3 (May 6, 2002) (discussing the executivization 
of the Vice Presidency). 
149 Goldstein, supra note 117, at 377–80 (discussing the transformative nature of Mondale’s 
Vice Presidency and the institutional change it created). 
150 Memorandum from Walter F. Mondale, Vice President, to Jimmy Carter, President, The 
Role of the Vice President in the Carter Administration, at 1 (Dec. 9, 1976), available at 
http://www.mnhs.org/collections/upclose/Mondale-CarterMemo-Transcription.pdf 
(setting out roles for the Vice President that would contribute to the administration’s 
success). 
151 WALTER F. MONDALE (WITH DAVID HAGE), THE GOOD FIGHT:  A LIFE IN LIBERAL POLITICS 
181 (2010) (“I got the president’s schedule every day and I was invited to every meet-
ing.”); Goldstein, supra note 117, at 379 (“President Carter and Vice President Mondale 
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Whereas Mondale’s predecessors during the prior quarter century 
had often operated outside the administration’s inner circle, Mon-
dale’s service provided a model for a contributing Vice Presidency 
and created expectations of vice presidential engagement at the 
highest levels of policy formulation.152  Since 1981, Mondale’s five 
successors have retained the basic resources Mondale obtained and 
have functioned as integral parts of the executive branch.153  Vice 
Presidents, and their top aides, take assignments from, and report to, 
the President.  Vice Presidents chair consequential executive branch 
initiatives—the Competitiveness Council (Quayle), Reinventing Gov-
ernment (Gore), bilateral commissions with Russia (Gore), task forc-
es on energy (Cheney) and guns (Biden), and so on.  They have 
managed confirmations of Supreme Court nominees, the war against 
terror, engagement in, and disengagement from, Iraq, implementing 
the recovery plan, and negotiating the country back from the Fiscal 
Cliff.154  They lobby congressmen to support presidential initiatives 
and brief them on confidential executive branch programs and deci-
sions. 
The White House Vice Presidency affords the President a high-
level, across-the-board general advisor who largely shares the Presi-
dent’s perspective, interest, and political destiny and a trouble-
shooter who can handle assignments that require high-level atten-
tion.  Regular participation in the executive branch better prepares a 
Vice President for presidential succession should that need arise and 
allows a smoother transition than would occur if the Vice President 
was unfamiliar to, and with, high-level members of the administration 
inherited.  As the office has become more substantial, it has attracted 
more able figures than would be the case if the main occupation was 
to sit and listen to Senators dissertate. 
Quite clearly, the Vice Presidency has changed in a fundamental 
and enduring way.  It is now a robust office in the executive branch.  
 
and their associates considered the resources that Mondale would need to succeed in that 
advisor/troubleshooter role.  These included the West Wing office, regular meetings with 
the president, the right to participate in important meetings, access to information and 
paper and responsiveness of personnel, placement of Mondale aides in significant White 
House positions, and sufficient staff support.”). 
152 Goldstein, supra note 117, at 380–81 (detailing the broad impact and influence that the 
Vice President began to have on administration policy). 
153 Id. at 380 (stating that Vice President Mondale’s successors retained the resources grant-
ed to Mondale during his tenure and that the changes enacted under Mondale’s tenure 
increased the importance of the Vice Presidency). 
154 See id. at 380–85 (detailing the crucial roles Vice President Mondale’s successors played in 
executive branch initiatives).  On Cheney, see generally BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER:  THE 
CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008). 
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Vice Presidents work in the White House and spend time several days 
(or more) each week with the President.  They attend critical meet-
ings in the Oval Office and Situation Room.  Of course, the Constitu-
tion does not require that the President seek their advice or deploy 
them as trouble-shooters.  Yet, the constitutional system, as it has 
evolved, gives the President enormous incentive to involve the Vice 
President.  The increased demands on the Presidency add value to an 
associate with the stature and skill to shoulder responsibilities that 
must be handled at the highest level.  The precedents from recent 
administrations have created expectations of vice presidential en-
gagement such that deviation would require public explanation. 
And, of greater importance in undermining the claims of original 
meaning, vice presidents rarely preside over the Senate anymore.155  
When they do, it makes news.156 
And when they now claim to be part of the legislative branch, 
people are incredulous.157  Yet no one, or almost no one, 158 suggests 
 
155 See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 639 (daily ed. Jan. 17,1975) (describing how Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield congratulated Vice President Rockefeller after Rockefeller presided over 
the Senate for four consecutive days in 1975, noting that Vice Presidents do not frequent-
ly preside over the Senate); Dom Bonafede, Vice President Mondale—Carter’s Partner with 
Portfolio, NAT’L J., March 11, 1978, at 383 (reporting that Vice President Mondale presid-
ed over the Senate for only nineteen hours in 1977); Nixon’s Own Story of Seven Years in the 
Vice Presidency, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 16, 1960, at 98–99 (estimating that Nixon 
spent five to ten percent of his time presiding over the Senate). 
156 See, e.g., Reid J. Epstein, Biden to Preside over Senate Gun Control Votes, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 
2013, 3:18 PM), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/04/biden-to-preside-over-
senate-gun-control-votes-161928.html (describing Vice President Biden’s decision to pre-
side over the Senate due to the importance of the issue being considered by the Senate 
and the possibility of a very close vote); Ed O’Keefe, Biden to Preside over Senate During Im-
migration Bill Vote, WASH. POST, June 27, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/27/biden-to-preside-over-senate-during-
immigration-bill-vote (stating that Vice President Biden rarely presides over the Senate); 
Sunlen Miller, With VP Biden Presiding, Senate Passes Democrats’ Tax Cut Plan, ABC NEWS:  
NOTE BLOG (July 25, 2012, 6:29 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/
with-vp-biden-presiding-senate-passes-democrats-tax-cut-plan (reporting about an instance 
in which Vice President Biden chose to preside over the Senate and noting the rarity of 
Biden doing so). 
157 See, e.g., Julia Malone, Cheney Asserts He’s Part of the Legislative Branch, BOS. GLOBE, (June 
22, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/06/22/cheney_asserts_
hes_part_of_the_legislative_branch (“Cheney has long maintained that he does not have 
to comply with an executive order on safeguarding classified information because his of-
fice is part of the Legislature.”).  But cf. Palin Says Vice President “In Charge Of” Senate, ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 22, 2008, 7:51 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2008/10/palin-
says-vice (stating that when vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin suggested an expand-
ed role in the Senate, she was met with criticism given the limited role of the Vice Presi-
dent in the legislative branch). 
158 But see generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Dick Cheney Unconstitutional?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 110 (2007) (asserting that the expanded role of the Vice President may, in 
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that the vice president should return to presiding over the Senate 
regularly.  And no one suggests that the Vice President violates his 
oath or is derelict in his professional obligation by ignoring the Sen-
ate duty, even though it is the only ongoing responsibility the Consti-
tution assigns him. 
III.  THE COMMON LAW DYNAMIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The experience of the Vice Presidency exposes important insights 
about constitutional change and about the efficacy of originalism.  
And what it suggests is, in short, that Article V is not the exclusive, or 
even the most common, means of constitutional change, that consti-
tutional changes occur not only when the Constitution is silent or 
unclear but sometimes, too, when its original meaning is pretty cer-
tain but ill-advised, and that departures from at least some original 
constitutional meanings occur with widespread support because of 
their beneficial consequences. 
In various contexts, others have pointed out that much constitu-
tional change occurs independent of Article V.159  The Vice Presiden-
cy presents another case study which illustrates this phenomenon.  
Article V’s multi-layered, super-majority amendment process did not 
produce the constitutional change in the Vice Presidency.  Congress 
never proposed relocating the office or relieving its occupant of its 
regular Senate-presiding duties, and the states neither initiated, nor 
took, any such amendatory action. 
 
some way, compromise his or her role as a replacement for the President if the President 
is impeached or resigns as a matter of policy); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Where Does the Vice 
President Belong?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, at A27 (arguing that extensive vice-
presidential involvement in the executive branch is unconstitutional). 
159 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 2–4 (suggesting that the Constitution guides po-
litical actors in forming public policy); Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United 
States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27:  Accounting for Constitu-
tional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 13, 13–32 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (“To designate 
something as an interpretation . . . even if one is ultimately not persuaded by it, is to ac-
cord it a certain legal dignity that is absent if one rejects the very possibility of its having 
been offered as a ‘good faith’ exercise of interpretation.  If one doubts the presence of 
good faith, or equally if one accepts interpretive sincerity but finds the actual effort to be 
manifestly incompetent, then one will be tempted to describe what is being offered as a 
surreptitious attempt to ‘amend’ the Constitution without going through the approved 
procedures by which inventions are accepted into the constitutional fabric.”);. David A. 
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1469 (2001) 
(“The first indication that the role of formal amendments may be less than meets the eye 
is how often important changes . . . occur without any formal amendment.”). 
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Instead, the transformation resulted from an informal political 
process that occurred over time.  Various Presidents created prece-
dents associating their Vice Presidents with their administrations.  
The initial involvements did not intrude on the Vice President’s pre-
siding role.  Some precedents worked and were repeated, even ex-
panded.  Others failed and were abandoned.  Vice Presidents became 
more visibly associated with the President’s administration and spent 
more time doing things in or related to the executive, not legislative, 
branch.  Americans grew accustomed to the Vice President operating 
at the President’s end of Pennsylvania Avenue even before President 
John F. Kennedy gave Vice President Johnson an office in the Execu-
tive Office Building, an act which attached an Article II address to the 
change already underway.  Experience produced knowledge, 
knowledge produced more understanding, understanding allowed 
improvement,160 and ultimately, after decades of experimentation, the 
process culminated in a new vice presidential vision, the Mondale-
model, White House Vice President.  Mondale’s prize West Wing of-
fice signified the Vice Presidency’s move from the periphery to the 
inner core of the executive branch.  America recognized this change 
as a positive development, and successive administrations have imi-
tated it.  The Vice President moved from the Senate’s presiding chair 
to one only steps from (and often, in) the Oval Office, from Article I 
to Article II. 
This development occurred through a non-judicial version of the 
common law process.  Like the common law, the change evolved in-
crementally over time.  Like the common law, it featured visible ex-
perimentation and responses to those efforts.  Like the common law, 
it was the product of many hands and minds.  Like the common law, 
it sought to produce pragmatic, workable, and beneficial solutions.  
Like the common law, precedents survived when they proved worka-
ble but were vulnerable to revision or even rejection when they did 
not function well. 
The nineteenth century’s recognition of the office’s inherent 
problems had been insufficient to bring constitutional change.  Re-
form did not occur until the new circumstances of the mid-twentieth 
century compelled new arrangements, and until an enhanced presi-
dency provided an alternative, more sensible home and role for the 
Vice Presidency in the executive branch.  The Vice President was 
 
160 Cf. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding should precede judg-
ing.”). 
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then happy to relocate, the Senate was willing to see him go,161 and, as 
Presidents from both parties appreciated the potential benefits, they 
welcomed the new recruit and drew him closer, especially once given 
a workable vision.  The development presented a win-win-win-win, for 
President, Vice President, Senate, and public, with no one ready to 
complain. 
The new White House Vice Presidency has claimed bipartisan 
support.  Carter and Mondale invented it, but Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush embraced it.  It describes the Vice Presidencies of 
Dan Quayle and Al Gore, of Dick Cheney and Joe Biden.  It has de-
veloped because logic commends it, and it has endured because ex-
perience has confirmed that logic. 
To be sure, the Vice Presidency that has emerged is consistent 
with the implicit vision of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which re-
gards the office as an important part of the executive branch and as 
closely associated with the President.  That consistency lends support 
to the constitutionality of the White House Vice Presidency.162  Yet, 
the resemblance between that constitutional vision and the office’s 
recent performance does not undermine the central points of this 
Article, that constitutional change occurs independent of Article V 
and sometimes at variance with original meaning.  The Amendment 
confirmed, rather than initiated, the Vice Presidency’s migration 
from the legislative to the executive branch.163  That journey began in 
the early twentieth century well before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
was ratified or even proposed.  Vice Presidents had largely aban-
doned their role as the Senate’s presiding officer, had associated 
symbolically and politically with the executive branch, and had un-
dertaken roles within it before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was rati-
fied in 1967.  Indeed, it is not surprising that the Amendment rested 
on ideas and mimicked practices164 that experience had suggested 
and that commanded acceptance.  How else could it have achieved 
the multiple super-majority approvals Article V requires?165 
 
161 The Senate generally did not embrace the presence of a presiding officer that it did not 
choose and could not remove. 
162 Goldstein, supra note 60, at 560–61 (“The Twenty-fifth Amendment signified a new con-
stitutional appreciation of the vice presidency.”). 
163 Id., at 508, 525, 530 (“The Twenty-fifth Amendment recognized constitutional changes 
that had occurred in the vice presidency, especially during the previous few decades.”). 
164 See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-fifth Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring Presidential 
Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 987 (2010) (pointing out ways the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment adopted existing practices). 
165 See Strauss, supra note 159, at 1459, 1462–63 (arguing that constitutional amendments 
often ratify existing practice). 
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Moreover, vice presidential duties developed independent of, not 
because of, the Amendment’s influence.  Mondale, a central figure in 
the development of the White House Vice Presidency, had been one 
of only five senators to vote against the Amendment166 and did not as-
sociate the White House Vice Presidency with its vision.167  Neither 
have his successors.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment recognized and 
confirmed evolutionary changes underway and reflected their under-
lying premises, but the logic of those changes, not the Amendment, 
propelled them forward. 
Finally, the text of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not override, 
or even address, the President of the Senate Clause.  The language of 
that clause has not been changed since 1789, but Vice Presidents now 
ignore the duty its original meaning imposed.  Instead, they preside 
over the Senate only when it suits their, or the administration’s, pur-
poses. 
The migration of the Vice Presidency from the legislative to the 
executive branch reflects a significant constitutional change outside 
of Article V, but some separate steps on that journey might be viewed, 
with exceptions noted below, as the product of appropriate exercises 
of some versions of constitutional construction.  It is surely possible to 
view some executive, vice presidential duties as consistent with, or 
permitted by, the original Constitution, even if it did not mandate 
them.  Accordingly, some discrete vice presidential activities which 
occurred at the President’s request, like some presidential advising, 
attending some meetings, or some diplomatic work, might be viewed 
as constitutional additions occupying space the original Constitution 
left open. 
Yet the constitutional change of the Vice Presidency cannot be 
categorized as simply an instance of constitutional construction con-
sistent with originalism for two reasons.  First, the cumulative effect of 
these steps transformed an essentially legislative-branch job to an ex-
ecutive-branch position.  Instead of the Vice President committing his 
time to helping the Senate function, the Vice President now spends 
his time trying to help the President succeed.  In substance, the steps 
moved the office down Pennsylvania Avenue from Article I to Article 
II, and this relocation represented a constitutional change of kind, 
not simply of degree.  Adams and Jefferson would not have recog-
nized the office they held first and second. 
 
166 111 CONG. REC. 15, 596 (1965). 
167  See generally Memorandum from Mondale to Carter, supra note 150 (outlining Mondale’s 
vision of the Vice Presidency without reference to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment). 
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Moreover, the Vice President’s abandonment of the duty to pre-
side over the Senate cannot be classified as simply constitutional con-
struction.  Most originalists seem to agree that original public mean-
ing constrains constitutional construction,168 that constitutional 
construction cannot override original meaning.  The President of the 
Senate Clause is not, on its face, as definite as constitutional provi-
sions which, for instance, prescribe an age for eligibility to hold of-
fice169 or a number,170 yet as original meanings go, it gives pretty pre-
cise instruction.  The Vice President was supposed to preside 
regularly over the Senate.  That original meaning can be ascertained 
with much more confidence, and it gives much clearer direction, 
than is true of most other constitutional clauses.171  If the original 
meaning of a clause is as clear as the President of the Senate Clause 
and yet is not appropriate for interpretation, then the domain of 
original meaning is pretty small indeed. 
If the original meaning of the President of the Senate Clause had 
been honored, the modern, West Wing Vice Presidency could not 
have occurred.  The emergence and success of that model only be-
came possible because Vice Presidents abandoned the presiding role 
that the Constitution’s original meaning imposed so that they could 
devote their time to advising and trouble-shooting in the executive 
branch.  Whereas reasonable persons like Adams and Jefferson un-
derstood that being President of the Senate compelled them regular-
ly to preside, we now view that clause as conferring an honorific title 
and that role as entirely formal and ceremonial save for some rare 
occasions when a tie vote seems possible.172  The text can comfortably 
bear that meaning once originalism is not treated as a trump card 
and other modes of constitutional analysis are considered.  The mod-
ern view is entirely reasonable in the context of our times, but the 
White House Vice Presidency cannot be reconciled with original 
 
168 Solum, supra note 5, at 26, 150 (“Almost all originalists will agree that constitutional con-
struction should be constrained by constitutional interpretation.”). 
169 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (setting age and citizenship qualifications for mem-
bers of the House of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (setting age and citizenship qual-
ifications for members of the Senate). 
170 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (giving each state two senators). 
171 See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power”); id. amend. V (“nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV (“equal protection of 
the laws”). 
172 It is, of course, possible to imagine situations which would undermine the White House 
Vice Presidency, such as the election of a President and a Vice President from opposite 
parties under the contingent election procedure set forth in the Twelfth Amendment.  
These contingencies seem unlikely to occur.  Even if they did, it is not at all clear that the 
Vice President would spend much time presiding over the Senate. 
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meaning, unless requiring the Vice President regularly to preside is 
synonymous with making that activity totally at the Vice President’s 
discretion.  Original meaning has now yielded to practice reinforced 
by beneficial consequences and supported by structural arguments. 
Of course, the transformation of the Vice Presidency may have 
been helped, in part, by the fact that originalism was not mobilized to 
oppose this constitutional change in the office’s transformative years.  
Until recently, originalism commanded few adherents, its focus was 
on judicial behavior, and its arsenal featured original intent and ex-
pectations, not meaning.  It was not able effectively to deploy histori-
cal fact to arrest the institutional development of the Vice Presidency. 
Yet, originalists can take little comfort from the fact that their ab-
sence from the field may have contributed to the transformation of 
the Vice Presidency into an institution very much at odds with the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  Essentially no one suggests that the 
Vice President should return to the Senate-President model.  Presi-
dents and Vice Presidents of both parties have supported the new 
White House Vice Presidency by implementing it.  Surely, new 
originalists will not now explain away the development of the Vice 
Presidency by saying that if only they had been better prepared for 
battle a few decades earlier, they would have prevented an experi-
ment which is widely perceived on a bipartisan basis to have pro-
duced a better, more sensible second office, executive branch, and 
government. 
And it would be surprising, indeed shocking, if a newly resurgent 
originalism acts to turn back the clock to reinstate the original mean-
ing of the President of the Senate Clause, to reverse the Vice Presi-
dency of Cheney and Biden, and to return to the days when John Ad-
ams and his successors regularly fulfilled the obligation the 
Constitution’s original meaning imposed and presided over the Sen-
ate.  Restoring the originally intended, expected, and meant Vice 
Presidency would reverse the conspicuous and positive trajectory of 
our nation’s second office to the detriment of our government. 
Originalists might accept the White House Vice Presidency as an 
appropriate case to deviate from original public meaning.  Indeed, 
some new originalists have argued that public-meaning originalism is 
not undermined by the need to make some exceptions when the the-
ory does not produce a palatable result.  For instance, Solum argues 
that the “binding force of the original meaning of the Constitution 
can be defeasible,” for instance, to address an “emergency or other 
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extraordinary circumstances.”173  He suggests that one “extraordinary 
circumstance” might be to accommodate “long-standing historical 
practice that has generated substantial reliance”174 but does not oth-
erwise define the scope of that exception.  Although the practice of 
Vice Presidents focusing on their executive branch and White House 
duties and ignoring their Senate assignment is gaining some age it is 
not clear that it “has generated substantial reliance.”  Each new ad-
ministration has concluded that the White House Vice Presidency is a 
model well worth preserving, yet each new set of incumbents embarks 
on their terms without any reliance on it.  The abandonment of the 
Senate role would seem to be outside the “substantial reliance” ex-
ception unless, of course, that concept is broad enough to encompass 
the public’s expectations based on demonstrated beneficent conse-
quences of patterns of institutional behavior. 
To be sure, the Vice President is now expected to engage in the 
work of the executive branch, and that assumption helps propel the 
White House Vice Presidency from one administration to the next.  
Precedents create expectations, and it would be embarrassing for a 
new administration to explain why its Vice President did not enjoy 
the resources or roles of his or her predecessor. 
But it would be surprising if new originalists intend to create such 
a large safety net under their theory.175  For, if the exception is inclu-
sive enough to accommodate non-originalist practices based on their 
good consequences, it would allow new originalists to excuse wide 
swaths of governmental behavior that are contrary to original public 
meaning simply on pragmatic grounds. 
Such a chain of reasoning would ultimately be subversive of 
originalism.176  Originalism, in many of its forms, ultimately assumes 
that historical fact should trump consequentialist reasoning.  It can-
not easily accept non-originalist outcomes based on their utilitarian 
appeal.  Such pragmatism is, after all, what originalism has claimed to 
attack when others engage in more pluralistic modes of constitutional 
argument in service of a vision of a dynamic Constitution.  The more 
willing originalists are to recognize pragmatic exceptions to the Con-
 
173  Solum, supra note 5, at 35. 
174 Id. at 35. 
175 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 22, at 266 (criticizing expansive recognition of reliance as a 
basis for overriding original public meaning, especially when applied to the “reliance of 
governmental actors or interest groups on the continued existence of unconstitutional 
powers or institutions”). 
176 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 7, 13–14 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia is not an originalist because of his will-
ingness to deviate from original public meaning to avoid unacceptable results). 
410 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
stitution’s original public meaning, the more malleable originalism 
becomes.  Originalism has been criticized for not being able to ac-
commodate certain doctrinal outcomes that enjoy widespread sup-
port.  The story of the Vice Presidency suggests that non-justiciable 
constitutional institutions may also, with widespread support, act con-
trary to the Constitution’s original meaning, presenting a further 
challenge for originalism and Article V formalists. 
The Constitution, as Jim Fleming reminds us, includes “majestic 
generalities and abstract principles” rather than being “a code of rel-
atively specific original meanings (as original expected applica-
tions).”177  Yet even some “relatively specific” provisions have accom-
modated broader interpretations than original meaning would 
suggest in order to produce beneficial consequences and more work-
able government.178  The evolution of the vice presidential role fur-
nishes an example of the way that constitutional change occurs out-
side of Article V and outside of the courts.  And it presents an 
occasion in which such change, even at odds with original meaning, 
endures with widespread acceptance because it contributes to more 
effective government and is consistent with other conventional forms 
of constitutional analysis. 
The generation which produced the Constitution understood that 
its creation was imperfect.  It minimized the consequences of inevita-
ble error by providing for a formal means of constitutional amend-
ment, by relying on Fleming’s “majestic generalities and abstract 
principles,” which invite interpretation and reinterpretation, and by 
regarding the Constitution as a flexible framework to allow workable 
government and to support political checks and balances, not as a 
strait-jacket to confine future generations to the preferences of the 
past. 
The experience of the Vice Presidency suggests that constitutional 
institutions evolve through a common-law-like process, sometimes to 
perform functions quite different from, even inconsistent with, what 
their creators intended, imagined, or prescribed.  The widespread 
 
177 Fleming, supra note 30, at 1184; see also BALKIN, supra note 10, at 14–15 (“We treat the 
Constitution as law by viewing its rules, standards, and principles as legal rules, standards, 
and principles.”). 
178 See, e .g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (giving Congress the power “[t]o coin Money,” inter-
preted to include producing paper money); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” 
interpreted to include musicians, photographers, and painters); id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13 
(giving Congress the power “[to] raise and support Armies” and “maintain a Navy,” not 
interpreted to preclude the Air Force or a single army). 
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acceptance of the Vice President performing these functions suggests 
some appropriate willingness to accept some deviations even from 
pretty hard-wired constitutional provisions with clear original mean-
ings in the interest of improving our government.  That is part of 
what has allowed our Constitution to endure for as long as it has, and 
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